One of the main advocates of the agreement was India`s most important strategic analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, also known for his long and controversial defender of India`s nuclear deterrent.  He argued that the convergence of strategic interests between the two nations imposed such a remarkable gesture on the Part of the United States, destroyed their decades of attitude towards non-proliferation, and that it would be unwise for India to despise such openness.  He also argued that it would still be foolish for the Indian elite not to recognize new geopolitical realities.   More than 150 non-proliferation advocates and anti-nuclear organizations have called for strengthening of the original NSG agreement to prevent the current global non-proliferation regime from being damaged.  Among the measures requested were: «Exports of U.S. equipment and technology have enabled China to use the safest technologies, including advanced design of U.S. reactors standardized for most planned Chinese nuclear power plants,» NEI said. In CO2 emissions, NEI said: «Nuclear energy is expected to support most of China`s non-emitting production capacity by 2030. An end to U.S. nuclear cooperation would disrupt China`s nuclear development plans and reduce its efforts to limit CO2 emissions. 29 According to a 2015 Ministry of Defense report, China`s nuclear arsenal consists of 50 to 60 intercontinental missiles7. In addition, China produces submarines that will eventually carry nuclear ballistic missiles, the report says. According to a non-governmental report, China has «about 250 [nuclear] warheads in stock.» 8 China declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing in 1996 and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but did not ratify it.
Mycle Schneider Consulting, World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014, 46, www.worldnuclearreport.org. Nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing technologies can also be used in the manufacture of nuclear materials and are therefore the main threat to proliferation. As part of its 123 agreement, the United Arab Emirates agreed not to seek enrichment and reprocessing technologies and to rely on the international market for reactor fuel supply. This obligation, combined with the non-proliferation criteria required for 123 agreements, has become a non-proliferation standard for nuclear cooperation agreements. In addition, Section 123 ensures that Congress remains in a loop, as these agreements are negotiated in unusual proportions. The President is legally obed upon to inform the House foreign affairs committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee «in a comprehensive and present manner of any initiative or negotiation relating to a new or amended» nuclear cooperation agreement in the nuclear field. Changes to this section are likely to make it more difficult for future administrations to become independent when such agreements are concluded. And while negotiations with Saudi Arabia are likely to stall for now, the United States is likely to face the Kingdom`s continued interest in nuclear technology research, as well as other major powers, such as China, in order to preserve and advance U.S. non-proliferation goals in the coming years. Given these developments, this position provides a short basis for these regimes and their role in the non-proliferation regime. Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have a recognized right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and an obligation to cooperate in the field of civil nuclear technology.